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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The California High Speed Rail Authority (“HSRA”) bases its 
preemption arguments on a misunderstanding.  Congress did not give the 
Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) “exclusive and plenary jurisdiction 
over railroad operations.”  The Interstate Commerce Commission 
Termination Act (“ICCTA”), 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11908, does not provide 
a pervasive scheme of national railroad regulation or planning that bars 
state exercise of police powers to protect the health and the environment.  
To the contrary, Congress entered the railroad regulatory arena in 1887 for 
the limited purpose of bringing economic stability to an emergent industry, 
and every statutory revision over the following century was directed at the 
same objective – facilitating a competitive market.  In continually adjusting 
the law to meet the economic concerns of the time, Congress has 
consistently preserved traditional state powers to protect public health, 
safety, and the environment, even when those powers incidentally affect 
railroad operations. 
The STB has no jurisdiction over the North Coast Railroad 
Authority (“NCRA”) project at issue here – the potential rehabilitation and 
reopening of a rail line shut down for safety reasons by another federal 
agency.  NCRA did not apply for or receive STB approval to restore service 
and recommence operation on its existing line.  The single action that the 
STB took (and had authority to take) was certifying Defendant Northwest 
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Pacific Railroad Company (“NWPCo”) as qualified to become the line 
operator should NCRA’s putative lease with NWPCo be consummated and 
the rail line reopened.  The STB did not approve day-to-day “operations” 
on the line, as HSRA implies, when it granted NWPCo’s operator status 
license application.  Nor does the STB have statutory authority to pass 
judgment on the wisdom of California’s investment decision to repair and 
reopen the line.  The STB merely granted new operator status if and when 
the line returned to service. 
The express language in the ICCTA does not preempt how a railroad 
decides whether to rehabilitate a line and bring it back into service, such as 
through the environmental review process NCRA used here.  Instead, the 
ICCTA preempts only those other state and federal remedies “with respect 
to the regulation of rail transportation.”  The California Environmental 
Quality Act (“CEQA”) does not target railroad economics, or even 
railroads, for regulation and thus does not intrude into that area in which the 
ICCTA forbids states to regulate.  As is undisputed, CEQA is a law of 
general application, intended to inform California public agency 
decisionmaking.  It requires disclosure of potential adverse environmental 
impacts from public agency project approvals and mitigation of those 
impacts where feasible.  Similarly, state law remedies for NCRA’s failure 
to comply with CEQA in connection with its repair and reopening project 
do not conflict with any STB-approved activities or ICCTA remedies. 
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CEQA is California’s tool to hold politically accountable subsidiary 
public agencies and the officials who fund and administer agency assets 
and decisions.  Under the Nixon-Gregory doctrine, absent a clear statement 
from Congress, federal law may not “trench on” how a state chooses to 
constitute itself as a sovereign political entity.  HSRA’s attempt to avoid 
the Nixon clear-statement rule by arguing that Congress intended that 
public railroads be treated the same as private railroads is unavailing.  
Without an unambiguous and explicit statement that Congress intended the 
ICCTA to preempt how states govern the decisionmaking process of public 
rail authorities, courts may not interpret the ICCTA to preempt how 
California determines the legitimacy and legal enforceability of decisions 
made by a subsidiary agency to conduct state-owned business. 
Moreover, as market participants, both public and private entities are 
free to consider the environmental effects of capital investments they make.  
HSRA cannot cite any ICCTA provision that preempts such internal 
decisionmaking.  Instead, to avoid the determination that NCRA was acting 
on behalf of the State, as a market participant, HSRA falls back on its 
fundamental misconception that Congress intended plenary regulation of 
the rail industry, notwithstanding the ICCTA’s clear intent to largely 
deregulate the rail industry and allow the market to operate freely.  HSRA 
is thus incorrect when it argues that California cannot act as a market 
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participant, or proprietor, when deciding how to lease and invest millions of 
dollars in rehabilitating a decrepit rail line. 
 Finally, HSRA argues that even if there are voluntary agreements 
not subject to ICCTA preemption, where those agreements impose an 
unreasonable burden on railroad operations, their terms are preempted.  But 
HSRA fails to apply the rule to the facts here, where agreements provided 
state funding necessary to repair and reopen the rail line and to secure 
authorization from the co-owner of the line for NWPCo to act as the future 
operator.  These agreements further demonstrate that CEQA is not 
preempted here. 
ARGUMENT 
I.   The ICCTA Does Not Preempt California’s Requirement that 
Adequate CEQA Review Precede NCRA’s Line Repair Project. 
 
A. HSRA’s Preemption Argument Rests on the Faulty 
Assumption of STB Jurisdiction over NCRA’s Project. 
 
 HSRA’s brief hinges almost entirely on an erroneous premise – that 
the CEQA “project” at issue here “is subject to STB jurisdiction and 
regulation under the ICCTA.”  California High-Speed Rail Authority 
Amicus Brief in Support of Respondents at 5 (“HSRA:5”).1  According to 
                                         
1
 See also, e.g., HSRA:10 (contending that “the public rail agency is 
subject to STB jurisdiction and is operating a railroad in interstate 
commerce pursuant to a license from the STB”); 38 (claiming this case 
involves “section 10501(b) and actions subject to the STB’s exclusive 
jurisdiction and regulation”); 40 (claiming NCRA is “engaged in interstate 
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HSRA, the STB’s approval of NWPCo as a potential operator established 
STB jurisdiction and therefore the ICCTA’s preemptive reach over 
NCRA’s repair and reopening project.  This premise is wrong. 
The CEQA “project” for which the challenged EIR was prepared is 
NCRA’s decision to repair and reopen the line.  The EIR here was intended 
to inform NCRA’s decision whether to move forward with rehabilitating a 
dilapidated railroad that another agency, the Federal Railroad 
Administration, shuttered years ago for safety reasons.  See AR:9:4592 
(Dec. 9, 1998).
2
  The STB did not assert any jurisdiction over NCRA’s 
process for deciding whether and how to reestablish service along the 
Russian River Division of the railroad.  It merely certified lessee NWPCo 
as a potential future operator of the line “upon consummation of the 
transaction.”  AR:16:8117, 8207.  That “transaction” included CEQA 
compliance and consent by the Sonoma-Marin Area Rail Transit District, 
co-owner of the rail line.  AR:13:6731. 
As discussed further below, the STB does not have authority over 
rehabilitation work on an existing line or any say in the process a private or 
                                                                                                               
commerce by railroad and under the STB’ s exclusive jurisdiction, and 
facing CEQA lawsuits”); 49 (implying NCRA is a “public rail agencies 
constructing or operating rail lines under STB jurisdiction”). 
2
 Citations to the Administrative Record and to Plaintiffs’ Consolidated 
Appendix appear, respectively, as “AR:[volume]:[page]” and 
“App:[volume]:[tab]:[page].” 
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public railroad uses to decide whether to proceed with that work.  Nor does 
the STB’s approval of a change in operator status preempt California’s 
ability to make an informed decision about state-funded, discretionary 
infrastructure projects merely because CEQA compliance may affect how 
repairs are conducted, may result in judicial review, or may convince the 
state not to go forward with the project at all.   
Were HSRA’s legal theory correct, the STB could dramatically 
expand its legislatively-limited jurisdiction and effectively commandeer 
taxpayer revenue to compel state action, even if California ultimately 
decided to forego the project for financial, environmental, or other reasons.  
As explained below, Congress did not grant such plenary authority to the 
STB, which is not surprising since HSRA’s position here is inconsistent 
with the most basic tenets of federalism.  E.g., Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898 (1997). 
B.   The History of the ICCTA Reflects Evolving 
Congressional Concern About the Financial Viability of 
the Industry, Not an Intent to Preempt Traditional State 
Decisionmaking Authority. 
 
HSRA’s preemption analysis relies selectively on a statutory 
predecessor to the ICCTA – the Transportation Act of 1920 – but ignores 
the context in which Congress was legislating.  The Transportation Act was 
designed to bolster the economic sustainability of the interstate rail 
transportation system as a whole.  It did so by giving the federal 
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government more rate-setting authority and shielding interstate carriers 
from financially onerous state mandates to invest in capital-intensive new 
lines or operations for the benefit of local commerce.  The Transportation 
Act was thus consistent with earlier and later versions of the law, all of 
which reflect Congress’ focus on responding to the unstable economics of 
the rail industry – rapid expansion followed by contraction.3 
In nearly 130 years of railroad legislating, Congress has never 
expressed an intent either to displace the states’ ability to control their own 
public expenditures and decisionmaking processes or to preempt the 
exercise of traditional state police power protecting public health, safety, 
and the environment.  Nor has Congress extended federal jurisdiction over 
repair work on existing lines.  The ICCTA, in short, is not the all-pervasive 
federal regulatory regime that HSRA suggests.  See Plaintiffs’ Opening 
Brief at 17-22 (“OB:17-21”); Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief at 3-4 (“RB:3-4”).   
  
                                         
3
 Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission: The Tortuous Path from Regulation to Deregulation of 
America’s Infrastructure, 95 Marq. L. Rev. 1151, 1152 (2012) (“Dempsey 
I”) (“Congress [in 1887] instituted regulation under the ICC largely to 
protect the public from the monopolistic abuses of the railroads.  Between 
1920 and 1975, however, the goal of the national transportation policy 
shifted to protection of the transportation industry from . . . unconstrained 
competition.”). 
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1. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 
American railroads were originally chartered under state law and 
regulated pursuant to historic state police powers.
4
  But early state efforts to 
curb monopolistic behavior and corruption in the rapidly-expanding rail 
industry proved largely ineffective.
5
  After the U.S. Supreme Court struck 
down Illinois’ ability to regulate freight rates on interstate routes, St. Louis 
& Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886) (finding regulation 
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause), the federal government 
stepped into the economic regulation of railroads for the first time with 
adoption of the Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”) in 1887.  The ICA 
outlawed rebates and pooling, forced railroads to publish rates, and 
ultimately required the new Interstate Commerce Commission 
(“Commission”) to ensure that rail fees were “just and reasonable.”  Smith 
at 339-40; Dempsey II at 265; Hovenkamp at 1035.  
                                         
4
 Zachary Smith, Tailor-Made: State Regulation at the Periphery of 
Federal Law, 36 Transp. L.J. 335, 338 (2009) (citing James Ely, Jr. 
Railroads and American Law (2001)); Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory 
Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad Problem, 97 Yale 
L.J. 1017, 1034 n.90 (1988) (noting that the rail system was developed 
“largely by means of state initiative and almost exclusively under state 
control” and that “before 1887 federal regulation was virtually 
nonexistent”). 
5
 See James W. Ely, Jr., “The Railroad System Has Burst Through State 
Limits”: Railroads and Interstate Commerce, 1830-1920, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 
933 (2003) (“Ely”); Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal 
History, 30 Transp. L.J. 235, 254-65 (2003) (“Dempsey II”).) 
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In response to early, narrow judicial interpretations of the ICA, 
Congress conveyed increasing authority on the Commission over the next 
three decades to regulate interstate rail rates.  Hovenkamp at 1035-44; Ely 
at 966-67; Dempsey I at 1163-64.  The economic challenge facing 
regulators at the time was that “[m]onopoly railroads earned monopoly 
profits, while competing railroads were driven into bankruptcy.”  
Hovenkamp at 1035-44 (explaining that “railroad interests seemed destined 
to be either filthy rich or perpetually broke”).  Fierce competition in long-
haul interstate markets drove rates down to the point where carriers often 
could not cover fixed costs, while state regulators tried to prevent 
monopoly rents on more profitable short-haul intrastate routes, where lack 
of competition allowed a greater return.  Id. at 1049-55.  The Supreme 
Court eventually recognized that this short-haul/long-haul problem 
threatened the long-term economic health of the rail industry, and allowed 
the federal government increasing leeway to address intrastate rates in 
connection with the Commission’s supervision of interstate routes.  Ely at 
969-73. 
2.   The Transportation Act of 1920 
These concerns moved Congress to enact the Transportation Act of 
1920.  Dempsey II at 272 (“After World War I, [federal] policy . . . shifted 
from one of protecting the public from the market abuses of the 
transportation industry to one of preserving a healthy economic 
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environment for common carriers.”).  Congress was concerned with 
“freeriding by the states,” with state-imposed low rates for intrastate rail 
traffic threatening the overall financial viability of the industry.  Ely at 976 
(citing R.R. Comm’n of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U.S. 
563, 588 (1922)).  To address this concern, the Transportation Act 
augmented the Commission’s powers, conveying new authority to 
supervise the rail industry’s issuance of securities and to regulate intrastate 
rates when they affected interstate commerce.  Ely at 974; Dayton-Goose 
Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456, 478 (1924). 
Relevant here, the Transportation Act also provided “that no 
interstate carrier shall undertake the extension of its line of railroad or the 
construction of a new line of railroad, or shall acquire or operate any line of 
railroad, or extension thereof, or shall engage in transportation over such 
additional or extended line of railroad unless and until the Commission 
shall certify that public convenience present or future requires it, and that 
no carrier shall abandon all or any portion of its line or the operation of it 
without a similar certificate of approval.”  R.R. Comm’n of Cal. v. S. Pac. 
Co. 264 U.S. 331, 344 (1924) (discussing paragraphs 18 to 21 of section 
402).  This new statutory language did not provide plenary federal 
jurisdiction over rail operations, but instead targeted specific activities, and 
there is no evidence that Congress intended the Commission to engage in 
affirmative planning for a national rail system, or to oversee repairs of 
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existing rail lines.  Rather, the narrow purpose of this new provision was 
“to prevent interstate carriers from incurring expense which will lessen 
their ability to perform well their interstate functions.”  Id. at 347.   
By requiring federal authorization for new construction, expansion, 
and operation of rail lines, Congress intended both to prevent overbuilding 
of expensive infrastructure believed to threaten the industry’s financial 
vitality and to bar “states from requiring carriers to provide service at a 
loss, a step which contradicted the national policy of building a strong rail 
system.”  Ely at 974-75.  Despite extending federal authority over new and 
expanded lines, the Transportation Act did not give the Commission direct 
authority over intrastate rail rates and explicitly exempted “the construction 
or abandonment of spur, industrial, team, switching or side tracks, located 
or to be located wholly within one state” from the new federal certification 
requirement.  R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 264 U.S. at 345 (quoting paragraph 22 
of section 402). 
3.   The Staggers Act of 1980 
It was not until the Staggers Act of 1980 that Congress directly 
addressed state jurisdiction over intrastate routes, even as it simultaneously 
“began the substantial economic deregulation of the surface transportation 
industry and the whittling away of the size and scope of the 
[Commission].”  H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 82 (1995).  In response to new 
concerns about the industry’s economic viability, the Staggers Act 
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“deregulated most railroad rates, legalized railroad shipping contracts, 
simplified abandonments, and stimulated an explosion of service and 
marketing alternatives.”  Id. at 91. 
Even with this considerable statutory overhaul, states retained a role 
in economic regulation, albeit one constrained by federal oversight.  The 
Staggers Act provided that “[a] State authority may only exercise 
jurisdiction over intrastate transportation provided by a rail carrier . . . if 
such State authority exercises such jurisdiction exclusively in accordance 
with the provisions of this subtitle.”  Pub. L. 96-448, § 214(b), 94 Stat. 
1895 (1980) (formerly 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)(1)).  The statute required each 
state “exercising jurisdiction over intrastate rates, classifications, rules, and 
practices for intrastate transportation” to submit its “intrastate regulatory 
rate standards and procedures” to the Commission for review and 
certification.  Id. (formerly 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)(2)). 
To effectuate these changes, the Staggers Act for the first time 
expressly preempted state economic regulation of railroads (rates, 
schedules, classifications, etc.) unless the Commission certified the state 
rules.  This new preemption language, codified in section 10501(d), 
provided: “The jurisdiction of the Commission and of State authorities (to 
the extent such authorities are authorized to administer the standards and 
procedures of this title pursuant to this section and section 11501(b) of this 
title) over transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided in this 
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title with respect to the rates, classifications, rules, and practices of such 
carriers, is exclusive.”  Id. (formerly 49 U.S.C. § 10501(d)).  The 
Conference Report explained that this provision preempted only state 
financial regulation of the industry:  
The Conferees’ intent is to ensure that the price and service 
flexibility and revenue adequacy goals of the Act are not 
undermined by state regulation of rates, practices, etc., which are not 
in accordance with these goals.  Accordingly, the Act preempts state 
authority over rail rates, classifications, rules, and practices.  States 
may only regulate in these areas if they are certified under the 
procedures of this section. 
 
The remedies available against rail carriers with respect to rail rates, 
classifications, rules and practices are exclusively those provided by 
the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, and any other federal 
statutes which are not inconsistent with the Interstate Commerce 
Act.  No state law or federal or state common law remedies are 
available. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 96-1430, at 106 (1980) (Conf. Rep.).  The Staggers Act thus 
made clear that state legislatures and state courts could not regulate railroad 
economics, even on intrastate lines, without federal concurrence.   
 While the Staggers Act altered the federal-state balance with regard 
to economic regulation of railroad rates, it did not substantively change the 
provisions of the earlier Transportation Act governing federal supervision 
over new construction, extension, and abandonment of lines.  Sections 
10901 through 10906 of the Staggers Act merely recodified the requirement 
(from section 402, paragraphs 18-21) of the Transportation Act that federal 
approval was necessary for construction, extension, acquisition, operation, 
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and abandonment of interstate lines under the Commission’s jurisdiction. 
(formerly 49 U.S.C. §§ 10901-06).  And section 10907 reiterated (from 
section 402, paragraph 22 of the Transportation Act) that “[t]he 
Commission does not have authority under sections 10901–10906 of this 
title over . . . the construction, requisition, operation, abandonment or 
discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching or side tracks if the 
tracks are located, or intended to be located, entirely in one state.”  Id. 
(formerly 49 U.S.C. § 10907). 
4.   The ICCTA of 1995 
With enactment of the ICCTA in 1995, Congress completed the 
economic deregulation that it began under the Staggers Act, further 
curtailing federal regulatory authority over the railroad industry.  Under the 
ICCTA, the new STB, as successor to the Commission, now had 
jurisdiction over the economic regulation of both interstate and intrastate 
lines, and the statute simultaneously “extend[ed] exclusive Federal 
jurisdiction to matters relating to spur, industrial, team, switching or side 
tracks formerly reserved for State jurisdiction under former section 10907.”  
H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 95.  While the ICCTA extended federal licensing 
jurisdiction (for new construction, expansion, and abandonment of 
interstate lines and for acquisition or operation of an existing interstate line 
by a new carrier) to intrastate lines, it did not substantively change the 
limited breadth of that licensing jurisdiction.  
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The ICCTA included several conforming changes “to reflect the 
direct and complete pre-emption of State economic regulations of 
railroads.”  Id.  These changes included: 
(1) deleting the language of prior section 10501(b) regarding federal 
certification requirements for state rate-setting because state rate-
setting was no longer allowed;  
 
(2) moving the “jurisdiction” and “preemption” language of prior 
section 10501(d) into section 10501(b); and 
 
(3) deleting prior section 10907 language that exempted the construction 
or extension of wholly intrastate rail lines from federal licensing 
certification and adding new language to revised section 10501(b) to 
clarify that “the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, 
or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, 
or facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to be located, 
entirely in one State” in order to bring new intrastate infrastructure 
activities within the STB’s certification jurisdiction.  
 
49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(2) (emphasis added); see H.R. Rep. No. 104-422, at 
167 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (“In light of the exclusive Federal authority over 
auxiliary tracks and facilities, this subject is integrated into the statement of 
general jurisdiction.”); S. Rep. No. 104-176, at 6 (1995) (“The bill would 
also eliminate Federal certification and review procedures for State 
regulation of intrastate rail transportation.”). 
 The House Conference Report on the ICCTA summarized the 
purpose of these conforming revisions, including the “construction” and 
“operation” language on which HSRA relies to argue incorrectly that the 
STB has plenary jurisdiction:   
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The changes include extending exclusive Federal jurisdiction to 
matters relating to spur, industrial, team, switching or side tracks 
formerly reserved for State jurisdiction under former section 10907. 
The former disclaimer regarding residual State police powers is 
eliminated as unnecessary, in view of the Federal policy of 
occupying the entire field of economic regulation of the interstate 
rail transportation system.  Although States retain the police powers 
reserved by the Constitution, the Federal scheme of economic 
regulation and deregulation is intended to address and encompass 
all such regulation and to be completely exclusive. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 95-96 (emphasis added).  Thus, Congress did not 
expand – or intend to expand – the scope of federal certification jurisdiction 
over new railroad infrastructure; it merely extended that limited jurisdiction 
to wholly intrastate activities that had previously been exempted in order to 
complete the economic deregulation of the rail industry.   
 This more complete historical context reveals the critical flaw in 
HSRA’s preemption argument.  In crafting the ICCTA and its predecessors, 
Congress was focused on the economic viability of the evolving railroad 
system, and its statutory response reflects concern about the destabilizing 
effect of state rate regulation and state-mandated overbuilding and 
expansion of rail lines.  As it stands today, the ICCTA gives the STB 
carefully-circumscribed exclusive jurisdiction to (1) adjudicate complaints 
concerning discriminatory rates or practices by common carriers (49 U.S.C. 
§ 11701) and (2) grant or deny licenses for specific infrastructure activities 
(new line construction, existing line extensions), change of operator status, 
and abandonment of existing lines (49 U.S.C. §§ 10901, 10903).  There is 
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no evidence in the historic record that Congress even remotely intended to 
create a federal agency with plenary railroad regulatory or planning 
authority or to usurp a state’s traditional ability to make decisions that 
protect public health and the environment.   
C. The ICCTA Does Not Convey STB Jurisdiction Over the 
NCRA Rail Line Project or Expressly Preempt CEQA 
Compliance for the Project. 
 
HSRA’s preemption argument incorrectly elides two distinct ICCTA 
directives – one addressing STB “exclusive jurisdiction” and the other 
expressly preempting “remedies . . . with respect to regulation of rail 
transportation.”  As the plain language and structure of the ICCTA 
demonstrates, neither of these directives prevents California from requiring 
that NCRA’s proposed repair and reopening project undergo adequate 
CEQA review or precludes citizens from ensuring that NCRA complies 
with that requirement. 
1.   The STB Lacks Jurisdiction Over NCRA’s 
Proposed Repair Project.  
 
Section 10501(b) provides “exclusive” STB “jurisdiction” over (1) 
“transportation of rail carriers, and the remedies [provided by the ICCTA] 
with respect to rates, classifications, rules (including car service, 
interchange, and other operating rules), practices, routes, services, and 
facilities of such carriers” and (2) “the construction, acquisition, operation, 
abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side 
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tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to be located, 
entirely in one State.”  49 U.S.C. § 10501(b).  As discussed above, this 
statutory language was intended to displace state financial regulation and 
infrastructure requirements that might undermine market competitiveness 
in the rail industry.
6
   
The reach of STB’s exclusive jurisdiction over construction and 
operational activities in subdivision (b)(2) is, in turn, defined and 
circumscribed by section 10901, which establishes procedures for 
“Authorizing construction and operation of railroad lines.”  Section 
10901(a) provides that “[a] person may—(1) construct an extension to any 
of its railroad lines; (2) construct an additional railroad line; (3) provide 
transportation over, or by means of, an extended or additional railroad line; 
or (4) in the case of a person other than a rail carrier, acquire a railroad line 
or acquire or operate an extended or additional railroad line, only if the 
                                         
6
 The STB’s exclusive jurisdiction under subsection (b)(1) to adjudicate 
disputes over allegations of discriminatory rates and other practices is not at 
issue here.  Chapter 111 of the ICCTA requires that common carriers 
operating a railroad provide (i) transportation services upon reasonable 
request, and (ii) nondiscriminatory access to terminal facilities, switch 
connections, and side tracks.  49 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11103.  If it receives a 
complaint about a carrier’s failure to comply with these obligations, the 
STB may begin an investigation and take appropriate action to compel 
compliance.  Id. § 11701.  The STB also may pursue civil penalties against 
a noncomplying rail carrier, and an injured party may seek money damages 
against the carrier in federal district court.  Id. §§ 11702, 11704, 11901.  
Because subsection (b)(1) is not relevant here, Plaintiffs do not discuss it 
further. 
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Board issues a certificate authorizing such activity under subsection (c).”  
49 U.S.C. § 10901(a) (emphasis added).  STB has limited discretion in 
exercising this jurisdiction.  It must issue a certificate authorizing these 
activities at the request of an applicant, “unless the Board finds that such 
activities are inconsistent with the public convenience and necessity.”  Id. § 
10901(c).   
Thus, consistent with the ICCTA’s legislative history and Congress’ 
statutory policy findings (see 49 U.S.C. § 10101), section 10501(b)(2)’s 
jurisdictional provisions and section 10901(a) work together to (1) prohibit 
states from regulating railroad rates or mandating new lines or service 
extensions and (2) prevent the STB from unduly impeding a railroad’s 
business decision to move forward with new construction, acquisition, or 
operation of lines or facilities.  The statute does not empower the STB, 
however, to compel a rail carrier to construct, acquire or operate a new line 
or extend an existing line.  Nor does it authorize the STB to intrude on the 
business judgments and decisions of any railroad (private or public) 
concerning whether to undertake such activities.
7
    
                                         
7
 Section 10903 of the ICCTA provides a somewhat more rigorous STB 
process in connection with potential abandonment of an existing line or 
discontinuance of service.  A rail carrier must submit a detailed application 
identifying the service and labor impacts of the proposed abandonment or 
discontinuance, and the STB must grant the action if it “finds that the 
present or future public convenience and necessity require or permit the 
abandonment or discontinuance.”  49 U.S.C. § 10903(d).  The rail line at 
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When it granted the change of operator request and authorized 
NWPCo to become the potential future carrier on the NCRA line, the STB 
was doing only that – qualifying a potential new operator.  The STB’s 
section 10901(a) licensing authority over new operators, new owners, and 
extensions of existing lines and construction of new lines is strictly reactive 
to carrier or other affected party applications.  Like most licensing bodies, 
the STB may grant or deny a request for one of the enumerated activities in 
section 10901(a), in response to an application, but Congress did not charge 
the agency with affirmative responsibility or authority for directing such 
activities. 
Most critical here, the STB does not have – and has never asserted – 
any section 10901(a) authority or statutory jurisdiction over the 
rehabilitation and repair work necessary to reopen the NCRA line.  RB:13; 
Lee’s Summit, Mo. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 231 F.3d 39, 42 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) (STB lacks jurisdiction over line rehabilitation); Detroit/Wayne 
County Port Auth. v. I.C.C., 59 F.3d 1314, 1317-18 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(jurisdiction does not extend to improvements of existing track).  As the 
STB itself has often explained, “Congress’ purpose in enacting the 
                                                                                                               
issue here was shut down by federal order and can be reopened only at 
substantial cost to California taxpayers.  The question of whether the line 
thereby has been or may be permanently “abandoned” is not before the 
Court in this case.  Rather, it is a question for another day, should 
California decide not to resume operations and instead abandon the line. 
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Transportation Act of 1920 [was] to encourage railroads to maintain and 
improve existing services, thereby strengthening their common carrier 
abilities, before spending capital constructing a new line or extending an 
existing one to serve new customers.”  Union Pac. R.R. Co.—Petition for 
Declaratory Order—Rehabilitation of Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Between Jude 
and Ogden Junction, Tex., FD No. 33611, 3 S.T.B. 646, 1998 WL 525587, 
at *3 (S.T.B. Aug. 19, 1998) (finding no STB jurisdiction over carrier’s 
repair and reopening of an inactive existing line).  Consistent with this 
purpose, “the construction of an extension to a rail line, or an additional rail 
line, is one that enables a carrier to penetrate or invade a new market” and 
therefore falls within section 10901, while the “rehabilitation and 
reactivation” of an existing line does not implicate such concerns and thus 
“does not come within the Board’s section 10901 jurisdiction.”  Id. at *3-4 
(citing Tex. & Pac. v. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry., 270 U.S. 266 (1926)).
8
  
Even where, as here, the STB has approved a change in the owner 
and operator status of an existing line, “no STB authority is necessary when 
a carrier proposes to improve or relocate an existing line without extending 
                                         
8
 See also BNSF Ry.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD No. 35164, 2009 
WL 1416468, at *8 (S.T.B. May 19, 2009); City of Stafford, Tex. v. S. Pac. 
Transp. Co., FD No. 32395, 1994 WL 613381, at *8 (I.C.C. Oct. 28, 1994), 
aff’d, City of Stafford v. ICC, 69 F.3d 535 (5th Cir. 1995); Denver & Rio 
Grande W.R.R.—Joint Constr. Project-Relocation Over Burlington N.R.R., 
FD 30733, 41 I.C.C.2d 95, 97, 1987 WL 97286, at *2 (I.C.C. Oct. 20, 
1987). 
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the railroad’s territory.”  Swanson Rail Transfer, LB—Declaratory Order—
Swanson Rail Yard Terminal, FD No. 37354, 2011 WL 2356468, at *2-3 
(S.T.B. June 13, 2011) (finding no STB jurisdiction over rehabilitation and 
reactivation of line that “will not take . . . rail service into any new territory 
or market” and noting that the new carrier had already obtained state 
environmental permits for the work).  The STB’s approval of NWPCo’s 
application for a change in operator status is not, accordingly, a federal 
mandate to repair and reopen the line.  Under the ICCTA “construction and 
operation” language on which HSRA’s argument hinges, the STB could no 
more order NCRA to reopen its line than could the DMV order someone to 
drive whose license has been revoked. 
Because no STB decision was required for NCRA’s rehabilitation 
and reopening project, no federal environmental review was required for 
those activities.  E.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co., 1998 WL 525587, at *5.  The 
STB’s only consideration of environmental issues came in connection with 
its August 30, 2007, notice authorizing NWPCo as the qualified future 
carrier on the line once the lease transaction was consummated and “after 
repairs” were completed.  AR:16:8207, 8540.  In that notice, the STB 
concluded that NWPCo’s “anticipated operations would be below the 
threshold requiring the Board's environmental review” in its governing 
regulations and therefore rejected Friends of the Eel River’s appeal of that 
decision.  See AR:16:8539-42.  The STB never considered the 
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environmental impacts associated with the line repair and reopening project 
that is the subject of the challenged EIR because such activities fall outside 
of its jurisdiction.   
HSRA’s suggestion that the STB made a permitting decision or 
considered environmental review for the project and that “federal law 
provides avenues to challenge the decision” is, therefore, incorrect. 
HSRA:17-18.  Because NCRA’s line repair project does not involve 
construction, acquisition, or extension of a line under section 10901, or the 
abandonment or discontinuance of a line under section 10903, there is no 
federal authority over the project and no federal “remedy” available to 
Plaintiffs.
9
   
The absence of STB jurisdiction over the NCRA repair and 
reopening project distinguishes this case from Town of Atherton v. 
California High-Speed Rail Authority, 228 Cal. App. 4th 314 (2014), where 
the STB asserted section 10901 licensing jurisdiction over the proposed 
construction of a new high-speed rail line, and the U.S. Department of 
Transportation prepared an elaborate Environmental Impact Statement 
(“EIS”) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act to accompany 
                                         
9
 True, the STB’s decision to grant NWPCo’s common carrier certification 
without any environmental review was subject to administrative challenge, 
and Plaintiff Friends of the Eel River, in fact, challenged it.  AR:16:8281-
8347.  But there is no federal venue to challenge NCRA’s environmental 
review for the repair project. 
24 
 
HSRA’s EIR.  The joint “programmatic” EIR/EIS and subsequent project-
level EIR/EIS for each segment of the high-speed rail project collectively 
span thousands of pages and contain extensive analysis for construction and 
operation impacts associated the new line.   
Here, by contrast, there is (and will be) no federal environmental 
review because NCRA’s repair activities fall outside of the STB’s 
jurisdiction.  Unless the repair occurs, there is no “operation” on the line 
subject to STB jurisdiction.  The proposed rehabilitation project, funded by 
California taxpayers, may have significant adverse environmental impacts.  
Under California law, NCRA must therefore complete an EIR that 
meaningfully discloses those impacts to the public and identifies mitigation 
that may lessen or avoid them.  If the Court finds that CEQA is preempted 
here, there will be no state or federal environmental review of any kind 
completed for the next phase of potentially damaging repair work along the 
Eel River Division of the line.
10
   
                                         
10
 Specifically, the EIR at issue here concerns only the repair of the Russian 
River Division of the line, not that portion of the line that runs through the 
Eel River Canyon corridor.  The dilapidated condition of that segment 
reveals the enormous amount of physical work – and attendant 
environmental impact – involved in any repair effort.  Hard Times on the 
Railroad: Eel River Canyon, YouTube (May 26, 2009), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RhCjYNKXNvk.   
 
Moreover, as a matter of law, whether any portion of the line is currently 
operating (legally or illegally) is irrelevant to the issue before this Court.  
The point in time relevant to this CEQA challenge is the date that the EIR 
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2.   Section 10501(b) Does Not Expressly or 
Categorically Preempt CEQA. 
 
Separate from its jurisdictional language, section 10501(b) also 
provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies provided 
under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are 
exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law.” 
49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (emphasis added).  On its face, this provision does 
not “categorically preempt” state actions merely because they may 
incidentally affect operation of a rail line in some way.  As Plaintiffs 
explained in their prior briefs, CEQA does not “regulate rail transportation” 
– it is a decisionmaking and political accountability tool – and thus does not 
fall within the ICCTA’s express preemption clause.  OB:14-27, 52-59; 
RB:3-12. 
This Court’s recent decision in People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor 
Transportation, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 772 (2014), is instructive.  There, the 
Court found that California’s action to enforce state labor and insurance 
requirements through the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) was not 
preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act 
(“FAAAA”), which expressly precludes states from enacting or enforcing 
“a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law 
                                                                                                               
was certified.  At that time, the line was not operating.  See, e.g., 
App:14:104:3768 (NCRA will not permit the operation until the EIR is 
certified). 
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related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to 
the transportation of property.”  Id. at 775.  This preemption language was 
borrowed from the Airline Deregulation Act, which Congress adopted to 
prevent states from undoing federal efforts to deregulate the industry.  Id. at 
779; Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008).  
Both this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have noted that the preemption 
language of the ICCTA, enacted a year after the FAAAA, is quite similar.  
Id.   
In Pac Anchor, the Attorney General (who represents HSRA here) 
argued that the FAAAA did not expressly preempt California’s UCL claim 
because the underlying state laws on which it was based were not 
specifically “related to” price, route or service involving the “transportation 
of property.”  Pac Anchor, 59 Cal. 4th at 782-83.  This Court agreed, 
finding no express preemption:  “[H]ere the FAAAA embodies Congress’s 
concerns about the regulation of motor carriers with respect to the 
transportation of property; a UCL action that is based on an alleged general 
violation of labor and employment laws does not implicate those concerns.”  
Id. at 783.  Likewise here, the ICCTA embodies congressional concern 
about remedies related to the regulation of rail transportation; a claim 
seeking to hold NCRA accountable for adequate environmental review 
under CEQA does not implicate those concerns. 
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HSRA argues that CEQA nonetheless constitutes a facially 
preempted “preclearance” requirement because, in its view, CEQA 
litigation: (1) “can prevent a public railroad from proceeding with an STB-
authorized project” (HSRA:14) or “can be used to deny the public railroad 
the right to engage in activities the STB has authorized” (HSRA:16); and 
(2) “has the effect of regulating ‘matters directly regulated by the Board – 
such as the construction, operation, and abandonment of rail lines.’” 
(HSRA:16).   
Notably, these arguments do not constitute an “express preemption” 
defense, as HSRA suggests.  The ICCTA’s plain text and legislative history 
say nothing about “preclearance” requirements.  Moreover, as a factual 
matter, the rail line rehabilitation work analyzed in the EIR is not, as 
explained above, “an STB-approved project.”  Most important, compliance 
with CEQA prior to commencing the repair project does not “regulate” rail 
transportation or in any way impinge upon the STB’s exclusive jurisdiction 
to approve applications for new or extended lines, service, and operators.  
HSRA at times claims that its express preemption argument is 
limited to CEQA’s enforcement remedies and does not address whether 
CEQA is preempted in general.  HSRA:9, n.3, 14-20.  Yet in other places, 
HSRA claims that CEQA is preempted in its entirety.  See, e.g., HSRA:46-
47 (agencies’ obligation to “comply with CEQA’s procedural and 
substantive mandates” for rail projects is contrary to the ICCTA’s purpose), 
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49 (when applied to public rail agencies, “CEQA is effectively 
regulatory”), 52 (the ICCTA preempts state regulation of rail 
transportation). 
The amicus brief that the Attorney General submitted on behalf of 
the California Environmental Protection Agency, et al. (“Resources 
Agencies”), on the other hand, observes that “CEQA is largely procedural, 
and its directives apply to public agencies.”  Resources Agencies Brief at 
15 (“Agency:15”).  The Resources Agencies thus recognize that the ICCTA 
does not expressly preempt CEQA’s application to rail projects – i.e., that 
such an argument is “overbroad.”  Agency:15.  Indeed, the Resources 
Agencies agree not only that CEQA is not preempted generally, but that 
California environmental laws adopted under the state’s historic police 
powers, including enforcement remedies, often are not preempted.  
Agency:21-23. 
The Resources Agencies attempt to soften the conflict between the 
Attorney General’s two briefs by claiming that preemption somehow 
operates with greater force where judicial remedies are sought against 
public agencies that have a single purpose to own and operate a “federally-
licensed railroad line.”  Agency:16.  This argument ignores that the 
Attorney General and California environmental enforcement agencies – 
including some amici here – have brought judicial enforcement actions 
against NCRA for numerous violations of California environmental laws.  
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See App:8:77b:2027-51.  Moreover, ICCTA preemption operates with less, 
not greater, force in situations involving public rail agencies’ obligation to 
comply with California law.  See Sections II-III. 
The decision whether to proceed with rehabilitation and reopening of 
the line is wholly within the discretion of a California public agency.  If a 
railroad (private or public) decides to undertake such a project, some facet 
of its future activities (line extension, new operator status, etc.) may require 
STB certification, and the STB’s approval or denial of that certification 
may be subject to the ICCTA’s exclusive remedies.  But there are no 
federal “remedies” or “avenues to challenge” capital investment decisions 
outside of the STB’s circumscribed jurisdiction.  This lawsuit cannot 
possibly “have the effect of second-guessing fully considered decisions 
already made by the STB” (HSRA:18) because there were no such 
decisions. 
D.   There Is No Implied or “As Applied” Preemption of 
CEQA Compliance or Litigation in This Case. 
 
In the alternative, HSRA argues that, even if section 10501(b) does 
not expressly preempt CEQA environmental review, Plaintiffs’ 
enforcement of the law is preempted “as applied” because the potentially 
available judicial remedies “would have the effect of preventing or 
unreasonably interfering with railroad transportation.”  HSRA:18-19.  This 
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is simply a different label for the “preclearance” argument, but Plaintiffs 
address it here again under the “implied preemption” test.   
As a threshold matter, any “as applied” preemption analysis must be 
conducted on a case-by-case basis.  The Resources Agencies make this 
point forcefully and repeatedly, explaining that the ICCTA generally does 
not preempt laws of general applicability enacted under the state’s 
traditional police powers, and that the question of “whether ICCTA 
preempts any particular exercise of police powers by the Environmental 
Agencies must be determined on a case-by-case basis.”  Agency:23; see 
generally Agency:21-23.  Here a trial was held.  While Defendants raised a 
general preemption defense in their answers (App:15:110:4053, 115:4248), 
they failed to satisfy their factual burden to establish implied preemption.  
In briefing, they argued “categorical” and “facial” preemption, without 
proffering facts necessary for the “as-applied” fact-based analysis.  See 
App:9:83:2328-31; see also Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 593 
F.3d 404, 413, 415 (5th Cir. 2010).   
Tellingly, the Attorney General recently obtained dismissal of a rail 
industry ICCTA preemption challenge to new state legislation imposing oil 
spill contingency plan and financial responsibility requirements on railroads 
transporting oil, arguing for a fact-based inquiry:  
ICCTA does not preempt all state regulation affecting rail 
transportation. . . . The question of whether a state regulation is 
permissible under ICCTA is inherently fact-intensive. . . . The Court 
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must analyze each individual regulation to determine whether it is 
preempted by ICCTA, considering whether the regulations are 
reasonable, certain, and non-discriminatory. 
 
Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion 
to Dismiss Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 14, Ass’n of 
Am. R.Rs. v. Cal. Office of Spill Prevention and Response, Case No. 2:14-
cv-02354-TLN-CKD (E.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014).
11
  Similarly here, 
Defendants identify no facts showing that this lawsuit “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”  Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) 
(articulating the test for conflict preemption). 
Even assuming Plaintiffs prevail and the court remands this matter to 
NCRA for further environmental review or the consideration of additional 
mitigation measures (and even assuming that NCRA decides to cancel the 
project), there is no implied or “as applied” preemption here.  Implied 
“conflict pre-emption exists where ‘compliance with both state and federal 
law is impossible,’ or where ‘the state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.’’”  Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015) 
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 See Exhibit A to Plaintiffs’ Second Request for Judicial Notice. 
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(quoting California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100, 101 
(1989)).
12
   
The U.S. Supreme Court in Oneok emphasized “the importance of 
considering the target at which the state law aims in determining whether 
that law is pre-empted.”  135 S. Ct. at 1599.  There, the Court held that a 
state antitrust lawsuit for false price reporting, wash trades, and 
anticompetitive collusive behavior was not preempted by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission’s jurisdiction over interstate natural gas 
rates, including federal authority to issue rules and regulations to prevent 
“any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” for interstate sales.  
Id. at 1598, 1603.  In so holding, the Court emphasized that the target of the 
antitrust lawsuit (collusive retail rates) was properly actionable under a 
state law of general applicability, even though application of that law 
“might well raise pipelines’ operating costs, and thus the costs of wholesale 
natural gas transportation.”  Id. at 1601.   
                                         
12
 As Plaintiffs explained in their Opening Brief, the implied preemption 
test is not, as NCRA and now HSRA suggest, whether CEQA will 
“unreasonably interfere with” or “unduly burden” interstate rail 
transportation.  OB:54 n.7.  Those words are part of the test for determining 
whether a state action violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.  Defendants 
have not raised a Dormant Commerce Clause defense here, nor could they.  
Similarly, given STB’s limited jurisdiction (discussed above) and 
Congress’ expressed intent to preserve state police powers, no party has 
argued “field” preemption here.  
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Similarly, after finding no express preemption under the FAAAA, 
this Court in Pac Anchor also rejected defendants’ “as applied” preemption 
argument.  59 Cal. 4th at 784-87.  That defense was based, in part, on the 
idea that a successful UCL suit would drive up the cost of doing business 
and thereby affect market forces.  Id. at 785.  The Court followed the lead 
of the U.S. Supreme Court in Dan’s City Used Car, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133 S. 
Ct. 1769 (2013), which held that state law consumer protection claims were 
not within the “target at which [Congress] aimed” in the FAAAA; that 
target was “a State’s direct substitution of its own governmental commands 
for competitive market forces.”  Pac Anchor, 59 Cal. 4th at 785 (quoting 
Dan’s City).  The ICCTA takes aim at the same target.  As it did in Pan 
Anchor, therefore, this Court should read the ICCTA’s preemption of 
remedies related to the economic regulation of rail transportation narrowly 
to accommodate state environmental laws of general applicability designed 
to inform public agencies, and the public, of a project’s impacts before 
deciding on a course of action. 
HSRA fails to address Pac Anchor, Dan’s City, and Oneok, although 
these recent high court cases are directly relevant here.  As was true for the 
generally applicable state law at issue in each of them, CEQA does not 
target rail transportation or stand as an obstacle to accomplishing 
Congress’s intent to deregulate the rail industry and make the market more 
competitive.  To the contrary, California’s purchase of the failed North 
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Coast line and the proposed major rehabilitation project are efforts to make 
this railroad financially viable.  But just as NCRA cannot, for example, 
operate the line in violation of California anti-fraud law or shield itself from 
state contract law merely because its business involves operation of a 
railroad, neither can NCRA – as a public agency – escape its environmental 
review obligations under CEQA by pretending that STB has “plenary” 
authority over the state’s project to rehabilitate the line and reestablish 
service. 
II. The Nixon Clear-Statement Rule Applies to California’s 
Governance of Its Subdivision Rail Agencies. 
Reading section 10501(b) to preempt CEQA here would run afoul of 
the clear-statement rule articulated in Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 
541 U.S. 125 (2004), and Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).  
HSRA contends that California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957), and related 
cases carved out an exception to this precedent for public rail agencies.  But 
there is no exception to the clear-statement doctrine in cases involving 
public rail agencies, and section 10501(b) does not contain unmistakably 
clear language preempting NRCA’s obligation to comply with CEQA.  For 
these reasons alone, this case is not preempted. 
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A. Nixon and Gregory Govern the Interpretation of Section 
10501(b); They Are Not the Basis of a Tenth Amendment 
Challenge.  
 
HSRA first misconstrues Plaintiffs’ discussion of California’s 
sovereign interest in self-governance and democratic accountability, as well 
as the relevance of Nixon and Gregory.  Contrary to HSRA’s assumption, 
Plaintiffs have not raised a constitutional challenge to section 10501(b)’s 
application here.  HSRA:27-30.  Rather, Nixon and Gregory establish a rule 
of statutory interpretation that requires an unmistakably clear statement 
from Congress before a court will read federal statutes, including section 
10501(b), to interfere with California’s arrangements for conducting its 
own governance.  Nixon, 541 U.S. at 140. 
Federalism concerns do, however, undergird the clear-statement 
doctrine.  This rule “acknowledg[es] that the States retain substantial 
sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which 
Congress does not readily interfere.”  Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461.  As 
Gregory explained, since the federal political process is the primary 
“protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress’ 
Commerce Clause powers, [courts] must be absolutely certain that 
Congress intended such an exercise.”  Id. at 464 (emphasis added) (citing 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)). 
HSRA’s discussion of the failed Tenth Amendment challenges in 
Taylor and United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), as well as of 
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the evolution of the Supreme Court’s Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, 
misses the point.  HSRA:28-30.  None of these cases, which predate Nixon 
and Gregory, involve the statutory interpretation issue presented here.
13
 
B. The Clear-Statement Rule Does Not Make Exceptions for 
Cases Involving State Governance of Public Rail 
Agencies. 
 
NCRA occupies two roles.  It is a common carrier that has entered 
the rail market and is subject to federal rail regulations.  See Taylor, 353 
U.S. at 568.  But NCRA also is a public agency created by the Legislature 
and bound by the public laws of this state, including CEQA.  Gov’t Code 
§§ 93000-93034.; Mountain Lion Found. v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 16 Cal. 
4th 105, 112 (1997).  
In Gregory, the Supreme Court recognized that the clear-statement 
requirement protects state laws that go “beyond an area traditionally 
regulated by the States” and are instead “most fundamental” to a state’s 
character as a sovereign entity.  Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460.  Gregory held 
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 HSRA incorrectly suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court “rejected” the 
application of a clear-statement principle in United States v. California.  
HSRA:28.  The Court actually evaluated a different cannon of construction: 
the presumption that a sovereign is not “bound by its own statute unless 
named.”  United States v. California, 297 U.S. at 186 (emphasis added); see 
also Taylor, 353 U.S. at 562 (discussing same).  Unlike the clear-statement 
rule, this cannon does not require an “explicitly stated” congressional intent 
to bind “the enacting sovereign” (i.e., the U.S. government) when such 
intent can be fairly inferred from a statute.  United States v. California, 297 
U.S. at 186.  By contrast, the clear statement rule articulated decades later 
in Nixon and Gregory focuses on whether Congress clearly intended to 
preempt state sovereign functions. 
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that courts must be certain Congress intended to infringe on such sovereign 
interests before reading a statute to “upset the usual constitutional balance 
of the federal and state powers.”  Id. at 460-61 (finding no unmistakably 
clear intent in a federal age discrimination statute to preempt state-adopted 
age limits for state judges).  As the Court recognized in Nixon, a state’s 
“chosen disposition of its own power” and control of a subsidiary agency 
are core sovereign interests.  Nixon, 541 U.S. at 140-41; see also City of 
Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 437 
(2002) (“[w]hether and how” a state grants powers to its subdivisions “is a 
question central to state self-government”).  This Court similarly has 
recognized that California’s sovereign power encompasses control over its 
subdivisions.  See Cal. Redevelopment Ass’n v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th 
231, 254-55 (2011) (quoting Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 
(1907)) (“The number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon 
[public agencies] . . . rests in the absolute discretion of the State”); In re 
Sanitary Bd. of E. Fruitvale Sanitary Dist., 158 Cal. 453, 457 (1910) 
(same); In re Pfahler, 150 Cal. 71, 79 (1906) (same). 
In United States v. California and Taylor, the Supreme Court did not 
address these core sovereign functions but instead found that, after entering 
the rail market, a state railroad could not operate in violation of federal law.  
Specifically, United States v. California held that the State Belt Railroad 
was not immune from enforcement of a federal statute requiring that rail 
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carriers use automatic couplers between railcars.  297 U.S. at 180, 184-86.  
The Court rejected the Belt Railroad’s argument that its status as a state 
entity removed its obligation to comply with this congressional regulation 
of interstate rail.  Id. at 183-86. 
In Taylor, the Supreme Court considered the applicability of federal 
law to the Belt Railroad once more.  The Court addressed a conflict 
between the Railway Labor Act, which granted collective bargaining rights 
to employees of rail carriers, and California civil service laws, which forbid 
such collective bargaining rights for state employees.  Taylor, 353 U.S. at 
559-60.  Again the Belt Railroad argued that it was not bound by federal 
regulation of rail carriers, and again the Court rejected that argument.  The 
Court held that, once California entered the interstate rail market, the “State 
may not prohibit the exercise of [labor] rights which the federal Acts 
protect.”  Id. at 560.  Because California’s labor law was directly hostile to 
the collective-bargaining rights guaranteed by the Railway Labor Act, state 
law had to give way.  Id. at 560-61, 65-67; see also United Transp. Union 
v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 681 (1982) (requiring a public 
railroad to comply with the Railway Labor Act did not violate the Tenth 
Amendment because “operation of a railroad engaged in interstate 
commerce is not clearly an integral part of traditional state activities”). 
These cases – like other cases that HSRA relies on – stand for the 
limited proposition that state rail carriers must comply with federal rail 
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regulations governing the interstate rail market.  See, e.g., City of New 
Orleans v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 195 F.2d 887, 889 (5th Cir. 1952) (public 
railroad subject to federal law “so long as it engages in interstate and 
foreign commerce”).  Contrary to HSRA’s argument, however, these cases 
do not go further and preempt state statutes that are unrelated to federal rail 
regulation and that instead only govern public state and local entities 
generally.
14
  Cf. Pac Anchor, 59 Cal. 4th at 783-84 (upholding California’s 
generally-applicable unfair competition law that did not directly regulate 
matters covered by the FAAAA).  There is no conflict between California’s 
interests in making public rail authorities comply with CEQA and the 
holdings in United States v. California and Taylor.  
Further, HSRA’s preemption argument focuses exclusively on 
federal requirements applied to rail carriers, arguing that they displace 
state-law obligations that otherwise control California agencies.  HSRA:30-
34.  Yet this exclusive focus on federal law conflicts with the analysis 
required by clear-statement precedent.  “The Supreme Court has applied 
Gregory [by] focusing on the state functions necessarily affected by 
operation of the [federal] statute, and not exclusively on the actual conduct 
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 STB decisions addressing federal regulation of public railroads 
(HSRA:32-33) are also irrelevant.  NCRA’s obligation to comply with 
federal law is undisputed.  To the extent that HSRA asks this Court to read 
these decisions as limiting California’s sovereign authority over its 
subdivisions, the Court should decline to do so.  Solid Waste Agency of N. 
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-74 (2001). 
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proscribed by Congress.”  United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech. 
Institute, Inc., 173 F.3d 870, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  This one-sided analysis 
leads HSRA to overlook the important sovereign interests that would be 
nullified by preemption in this case, and assumes a conflict between CEQA 
and Congress’ power to regulate rail where none exists. 
As previously explained, through CEQA, the Legislature established 
requirements for public-agency decisionmaking and accountability when 
agencies take actions that may cause significant environmental impacts.  
OB:29-32, 36; RB:18.  CEQA is but one of many agency-governance and 
accountability statutes through which California exercises sovereign control 
over its subdivisions.  See Nixon, 541 U.S. at 140-41; see also Gov’t Code 
§§ 6250-6277 (California Public Records Act); §§ 11120-11132 (Bagley-
Keene Act); §§ 54950-71132 (Brown Act); §§ 81000-91094 (Political 
Reform Act). 
In fact, the sovereign interests that CEQA advances extend further 
than the self-governance principles that Nixon protected.  California 
expresses its sovereignty through laws that reach the heart of representative 
government in this State.  Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461; Agua Caliente Band of 
Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 4th 239, 249, 256-59 (2006) 
(acknowledging that the Political Reform Act’s regulation of electoral 
process furthers “a state interest that is beyond . . . commercial and 
regulatory interests”).  This Court has held that CEQA’s environmental 
41 
 
review process facilitates informed democracy by promoting agency 
accountability to the electorate.  An EIR “is a document of accountability.  
If CEQA is scrupulously followed, the public will know the basis on which 
its responsible officials either approve or reject environmentally significant 
action, and the public, being duly informed, can respond accordingly to 
action with which it disagrees.”  Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n v. 
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 47 Cal. 3d 376, 392 (1988); see also Concerned 
Citizens of Costa Mesa, Inc. v. 32nd Dist. Agricultural Ass’n, 42 Cal. 3d 
929, 936 (1986) (the “privileged position” that the public holds in the 
CEQA process “is based . . . on notions of democratic decision-making”).  
Consequently, requiring an agency “to fully comply with the letter of 
[CEQA],” including its public disclosure provisions, facilitates “appropriate 
action come election day should a majority of the voters disagree” with an 
agency’s decision.  People v. County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 842 
(1974). 
For these reasons, the sovereignty issues here reach further than 
those in Nixon.  There, the state sovereignty at stake was limited to the 
state’s authority to control its subsidiary agencies.  CEQA serves a similar 
purpose, but because it is also an instrument that California selected to 
enhance political accountability in public decisionmaking, the clear-
statement requirement operates with greater force here.  
42 
 
The facts in Nixon further demonstrate why preemption of CEQA is 
unavailable here.  Like regulation of railways, regulation of the 
telecommunications industry falls well within Congress’ commerce power.  
Unlike the STB’s limited regulatory authority, however, Congress chose to 
give broad regulatory authority to the Federal Communications 
Commission.  See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700 
(1984) (Congress gave the FCC “broad responsibilities to regulate all 
aspects of interstate communication”); Freeman v. Burlington Broads., 
Inc., 204 F.3d 311, 320 (2d Cir. 2000) (recognizing “the FCC’s broad 
authority” over telecommunications).  Despite this broad federal authority 
over telecommunications, Nixon refused to uniformly apply, to both state 
and private telecommunication providers, Congress’ prohibition on states 
restricting the “ability of any entity” to offer telecommunication services.  
Nixon, 541 U.S. at 140-41.   
Moreover, Nixon resolved a much greater conflict between Missouri 
law and federal law than is alleged to exist between CEQA and the ICCTA.  
In Nixon, Missouri’s law specifically targeted the subject matter of the 
Telecommunications Act’s preemption clause – the entry of “an entity” 
(i.e., a municipality) into the telecommunications market.  Nixon, 541 U.S. 
at 129.  Nonetheless, the Court would not read that federal preemption 
clause to interfere with the state’s control over telecommunication services 
offered by its subdivision.  Id. at 140-41.  Here, while ICCTA preemption 
43 
 
is limited to state regulation of rail transportation, CEQA does not target 
the railroad industry.  As a law of general application, CEQA’s effect on 
railroads is, at most, indirect and incidental.  Compared with Nixon, it is 
even harder to find congressional intent to preempt how California controls 
public railroads through CEQA.  
If a conflict did arise between California’s exercise of its sovereign 
interests through CEQA and federal regulation in the ICCTA, Nixon and 
Gregory still require an unmistakably clear statement before the state’s 
sovereign interest gives way.  But HSRA, like Defendants, is unable to 
identify any ICCTA text or legislative history that clearly shows 
congressional intent to preempt state control of the decisionmaking 
processes of public rail agencies.  The “context of section 10501(b)” 
(HSRA:34) does not suffice.  
C. The Court Should Be Skeptical of Rail Agencies’ 
Attempts to Shed the Legislature’s and the People’s 
Sovereign Control. 
 
In enacting California’s open-meeting laws, the Brown Act and the 
Bagley-Keene Act, the Legislature observed that the people of California 
“do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies that serve them.”  Gov’t 
Code §§ 11120, 54950.  To the contrary, “the people insist on remaining 
informed so that they may retain control over the [agencies] they have 
created.”  Id. 
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Though it is subject to the sovereign control of the Legislature and 
the electorate, HSRA purports to represent the views of “the State” 
regarding ICCTA preemption of CEQA.  See HSRA:2.  But HSRA is 
simply the agency that the Legislature created to pursue California’s high 
speed rail project.  See Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 185020-185511.  HSRA 
does not speak for the State any more than other public agencies in 
California.  Cf. In re Pfahler, 150 Cal. at 80 (defining “state” to encompass 
“the entire body of the people, who together form the body politic, known 
as the ‘state’”). 
Indeed, the amicus briefs in this case reveal marked disagreement 
among California agencies regarding the ICCTA’s preemptive reach.  As a 
single-purpose rail agency, HSRA’s desire for ICCTA preemption is 
understandably aligned with NCRA.  But other agencies established by the 
Legislature recognize the impropriety of extending ICCTA preemption to 
this case.  See Brief of Amici Curiae South Coast Air Quality Management 
District and Bay Area Air Quality Management District.  Even the position 
taken by the California Environmental Protection Agency and the Natural 
Resources Agency is in tension with the position of HSRA and NCRA.  See 
Section I.C. 
As discussed, HSRA and NCRA must comply with numerous 
California laws (including CEQA) that apply only to public agencies in this 
state.  Indeed, the Legislature has imposed specific obligations on HSRA.  
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See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 185033-185511 (requirements for 
submitting business plans to the Legislature); § 185033.5 (requirements for 
submitting project update reports to the Secretary of Transportation); 
§ 185036.1 (requirement relating to purchasing California-made 
equipment).  Rail agencies like HSRA and NCRA cannot, solely by virtue 
of their rail carrier status, disregard such directives from the Legislature and 
their ultimate responsibility to the people of California.  
Because “preempting state or local governmental self-regulation (or 
regulation of political inferiors) would work so differently from preempting 
regulation of private players,” Nixon found “it highly unlikely that 
Congress intended to set off on such uncertain adventures.”  Nixon, 541 
U.S. at 126.  The Court should be similarly skeptical of HSRA’s and 
NCRA’s attempt to shed their statutory obligations, and should preserve 
California’s sovereign control over these subdivisions. 
III. The ICCTA Does Not Preempt CEQA’s Requirements 
Pertaining to State Proprietary Conduct. 
In addition to the clear-statement doctrine, the market participant 
doctrine defeats preemption here.  In authorizing HSRA and NCRA to use 
public funds and resources to pursue opportunities in the rail market, the 
State acted as a proprietor of public property.  Under the market participant 
doctrine, courts presume that state and local requirements governing such 
market activities are not preempted unless Congress evidences contrary 
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intent.  In Atherton, HSRA unsuccessfully argued against the market 
participant doctrine, contending that it does not save from ICCTA 
preemption CEQA’s requirements for the State’s proprietary rail projects. 
HSRA renews that failed argument here.  But despite HSRA’s contention, 
the market participant doctrine is both “available” in the context of ICCTA 
preemption and defeats any such preemption here. 
A. The Market Participant Doctrine Applies to Preemption 
Under the ICCTA. 
Some courts conduct a threshold inquiry to determine whether the 
market participant doctrine is available under a particular statutory scheme.  
They consider whether a statute “contains ‘any express or implied 
indication by Congress’” that it intended to preempt state proprietary 
activities.  Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 498 F.3d 
1031, 1042 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. 
Associated Builders & Contractors, 507 U.S. 218, 231 (1993)) (“Boston 
Harbor”)). 
HSRA claims that Atherton was wrongly decided because it 
supposedly failed to undertake this analysis.  HSRA:41.  Atherton, 
however, recognized this threshold inquiry but found that HSRA impliedly 
conceded “that the [market participant] doctrine applies” to ICCTA 
preemption by expressly reserving HSRA’s right to assert the doctrine in 
future ICCTA preemption cases.  228 Cal. App. 4th at 337 n.5.  
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HSRA now turns away from that earlier concession by arguing that 
the ICCTA will never accommodate the market participant doctrine.  The 
ICCTA does not support HSRA’s new position.  The statute does not 
contain an express statement preempting states’ proprietary decisions 
regarding rail transportation.  Consequently, HSRA contends that the 
ICCTA impliedly preempts proprietary decisionmaking, arguing that 
applying the market participant doctrine here “would be contrary to both 
congressional and state intent.”  HSRA:40.  HSRA is incorrect on both 
counts. 
First, there is no “state intent” to remove either NCRA or HSRA 
from their respective obligations to comply with CEQA when carrying out 
State proprietary activities.  The Legislature has never exempted these rail 
agencies from CEQA.  See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 93000-93034 (lacking 
CEQA exemption for NCRA); Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 185000-185511 
(lacking CEQA exemption for HSRA).  Instead, the Legislature has 
repeatedly assumed that both agencies must comply with the Act.  For 
instance, the Legislature appropriated over $60 million to NCRA under the 
State’s Transportation Congestion Relief Program, which anticipates that 
funded agencies will comply with CEQA.  Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 
14556.40(a)(32), 14556.13(b)(1) 14556.50(e), (i); see also App:9:84:2373 
(Relief Program funding guidelines making recipient agencies responsible 
for “[c]omplying with all legal requirements . . . including . . . CEQA”).  
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The Legislature likewise presented the Proposition 1A funding plan for the 
high-speed rail project to California’s voters for approval, expecting that 
HSRA would continue to comply with CEQA.  Atherton, 228 Cal. App. 4th 
at 338; see also Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 185033 (biennial business plans to 
the Legislature include the “expected schedule for completing 
environmental review . . . for each segment or combination of segments of 
Phase 1” of that project). 
Nor did Congress, in enacting the ICCTA, impliedly preempt state 
proprietary activity in the rail market.  HSRA primarily argues that 
applying the market participant doctrine here is contrary to the ICCTA’s 
“preemption principles” and would defeat Congress’s intent “to have 
uniform and exclusive federal regulation.”  HSRA:39-40.  But this is not 
the correct threshold inquiry.  Instead, courts consider only whether 
“Congress intended to extend the [federal statute’s] reach to preempt state 
proprietary action.”  Engine Mfrs., 498 F.3d at 1043.  Nothing in the 
ICCTA implies that Congress intended to foreclose state proprietary 
activity in the rail market.  Rather, numerous cases cited by HSRA 
acknowledge that public entities can enter the rail market, just like private 
entities.  See HSRA:40. 
Moreover, while HSRA acknowledges the deregulatory purpose of 
the ICCTA (HSRA:24-25), it fails to reconcile its “uniformity” argument 
with the largely-deregulated rail market.  The goal of both the Staggers Act 
49 
 
and the ICCTA was to reduce federal regulation over interstate rail and 
encourage free market activity.  See Section I; 49 U.S.C. § 10101(2) 
(statutory policy “to minimize the need for Federal regulatory control over 
the rail transportation system”).  Deregulation allows both public and 
private entities to decide for themselves how to engage the rail market, and 
Congress likely expected that Burlington Northern, Union Pacific, and the 
State of California would make these decisions differently, not uniformly.  
Nothing in the ICCTA forecloses either private or state proprietors from 
setting their own criteria governing such decisions.  Cf. Tocher v. City of 
Santa Ana, 219 F.3d 1040, 1048-50 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding public 
market participation despite the FAAAA preemption clause intended to set 
national standards for conducting towing business), abrogated on other 
grounds in City of Columbus, 536 U.S. at 432. 
Likewise, applying the market participant doctrine in ICCTA 
preemption cases does not intrude on the STB’s limited jurisdiction.  The 
STB never “specifically authorized” NCRA’s repair activities here.  
HSRA:41; see Section I.  Moreover, grants of federal regulatory 
jurisdiction do not by themselves demonstrate congressional intent to 
preempt state market behavior.  See Engine Mfrs., 498 F.3d at 1042-43 
(market participant doctrine available despite EPA’s regulatory jurisdiction 
under the Clean Air Act); Atherton, 228 Cal. App. 4th at 329-41 (applying 
the market participant doctrine to ICCTA preemption claim after the STB 
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exercised jurisdiction over the high-speed rail project).  Thus, the ICCTA 
does not imply any congressional intent to preempt California’s proprietary 
decisions in the rail market and foreclose the availability of the market 
participant doctrine. 
B. NCRA’s Obligation to Comply with CEQA When It 
Pursues Proprietary State Activity Is Not Preempted. 
The market participant doctrine recognizes that public entities, like 
private entities, engage markets in numerous ways to pursue their unique 
interests.  See Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 227.  As Plaintiffs have 
explained, federal courts have adopted alternative tests to determine 
whether a particular state action falls within the market participant doctrine. 
See OB:39 (citing Cardinal Towing v. City of Bedford, Tex., 180 F.3d 686 
(5th Cir. 1999), and Johnson v. Rancho Santiago Cmty. Coll. Dist., 623 
F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2010)).  Here, the relevant test is whether the 
challenged state action reflects the state’s “interest in its efficient 
procurement of needed goods and services, as measured by comparison 
with the typical behavior of private parties in similar circumstances.”  
Cardinal Towing, 180 F.3d at 693 (emphasis added); cf. Children's Hosp. 
& Med. Ctr. v. Bonta, 97 Cal. App. 4th 740, 768 (2002) (declining to apply 
the market participant doctrine where there was “no genuine private market 
regarding the delivery of” healthcare at issue there). 
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HSRA echoes Defendants’ argument that this test is not satisfied 
because “[o]nly public agencies must comply with CEQA’s procedural and 
substantive mandates.”  HSRA:46-47.  But that fact is irrelevant under the 
market participant doctrine.  Numerous courts have upheld standards for 
proprietary actions that apply to public agencies but not private entities.  
See White v. Mass. Council of Const. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983); 
Engine Mfrs., 498 F.3d at 1045-46; Tocher, 219 F.3d at 1048-50; Big 
Country Foods, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Anchorage School Dist., Anchorage, 
Alaska, 952 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 1992).  There is no requirement 
that public and private proprietors act identically.  See Rancho Santiago, 
623 F.3d at 1026-28. 
Moreover, “‘efficient procurement’ means procurement that serves 
the state’s purposes – which may include purposes other than saving money 
– just as private entities serve their purposes by taking into account factors 
other than price.”  Engine Mfrs., 498 F.3d at 1045-46.  It is undisputed that 
private entities may, as part of their proprietary actions, embrace 
environmental standards in their decisionmaking processes.  Id. at 1047 
(citing private programs for procuring less-polluting vehicles]; see also 
Servs. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 99 v. Options—A Child Care and Human 
Services Agency, 200 Cal. App. 4th 869, 873, 877 (2011) (private childcare 
provider agreed to Brown Act compliance).  Neither the parties nor amici 
have identified a provision in the ICCTA that would prevent such private 
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behavior.  RB:23-24.  Consequently, the ICCTA does not preempt CEQA’s 
application to state proprietary actions, which serves California’s purpose 
of considering and, where feasible, reducing the environmental impacts of 
public actions before resources are irretrievably committed to those 
endeavors.  Laurel Heights, 47 Cal. 3d at 392. 
C. Contrary to HSRA’s Assertion, Market Participant Cases 
Protect from Preemption State Rules Governing 
Proprietary Activity. 
HSRA contends that this case does not involve state proprietary 
conduct because “a public agency’s actions to comply with CEQA, 
standing alone, are not market participation.”  HSRA:44.  This argument 
misunderstands both CEQA and the market participant doctrine. 
First, an agency’s actions and obligation to comply with CEQA do 
not “stand alone.”  CEQA always applies to decisions regarding 
“discretionary projects proposed to be carried out or approved by public 
agencies.”  Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21080(a).  Relevant here, discretionary 
projects subject to CEQA include “actions undertaken by any public agency 
including but not limited to public works construction” and publicly-
financed activities.  Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15378(a)(1), (2).  Thus, 
CEQA operates only in conjunction with discretionary agency actions to 
pursue the state’s proprietary interests, including NCRA’s discretionary 
actions to lease the rail line, fund line repair and rehabilitation, and carry 
out its project.  See Agency:7-8 (stating same).  HSRA is simply wrong to 
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claim that “voluntary action by [NCRA] making choices in a specific free 
market . . . [is] lacking in this case.”  HSRA:44. 
HSRA’s attempt to define NCRA as a separate proprietor 
“regulated” by CEQA does not change this analysis.  HSRA:47-49.  NCRA 
exists only as an agent of the State of California; it has no legally distinct 
status.  City of Columbus, 536 U.S. at 425 (state subdivisions “are created 
as convenient agencies to exercise such of the State’s powers as it chooses 
to entrust to them”).  Under the market participant doctrine, it is irrelevant 
that “not only the state, but also some of its political subdivisions, are 
directed to take” actions.  Engine Mfrs., 498 F.3d at 1045-46; Big Country 
Foods, 952 F.2d at 1179 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A state should not be penalized 
for exercising its power through smaller, localized units; local control 
fosters both administrative efficiency and democratic governance.”).  
NCRA’s spending and contractual actions in furtherance of its statutory 
mission to own and operate the NWP line, including spending on major 
repairs to reopen the line and on an EIR to evaluate the impacts of that 
work, merely advance the state’s proprietary interests.  See AR:13:6796, 
16:8080, 8572; Gov’t Code § 93020 (empowering NCRA to “acquire, own, 
operate, and lease … property” to pursue its mission). 
Second, the market participant doctrine does not support HSRA’s 
attempt to sever CEQA and its enforcement mechanisms from state 
proprietary conduct.  Rather, under the doctrine, courts evaluate the 
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standards that govern proprietary actions as a component of the larger state 
proprietary decisionmaking process.  For instance, in Engine 
Manufacturers, plaintiffs argued that the Clean Air Act preempted “fleet 
rules” adopted by the South Coast Air Quality Management District, which 
set various environmental standards for vehicles purchased or leased by 
state or local agencies.  498 F.3d at 1036-37.  In establishing these rules, 
the South Coast Air District did not itself procure goods in the marketplace.  
Rather, the District’s rules set standards that “govern[ed] purchasing, 
procuring, leasing, and contracting for the use of vehicles by state and local 
governmental entities.”  Id. at 1045.  The Ninth Circuit held that the 
environmental standards required for these proprietary actions ultimately 
reflected California’s “interest in its efficient procurement of needed goods 
and services,” and thus the rules were not preempted.  Id. at 1048; but see 
1049 (fleet rules that governed private purchases fell outside of the market 
participant doctrine). 
Similarly, in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction 
Employers, Inc., the Supreme Court considered an as-applied challenge to 
an executive order setting workforce standards for construction projects 
financed by the city of Boston.  460 U.S. at 205-06, 209.  The court held 
that “applying . . . the executive order to projects funded wholly with city 
funds” was protected under the market participant doctrine because “the 
Commerce Clause establishes no barrier to conditions” that govern the 
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market behavior of public entities.  Id. at 209, 214-15.  Other market 
participant cases employ the same method of analysis.  See Hughes v. 
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 797-98, 809-10 (1976) (upholding 
statutes enacted to encourage market transactions for protecting Maryland’s 
environment); Tocher, 219 F.3d 1040, 1048-49 (upholding ordinance 
authorizing the creation of “rules and regulations to guide [a city’s] 
formation of contracts for towing services”); Big Country Foods, 952 F.2d 
at 1175 (upholding Alaska statute requiring school districts to pay more to 
purchase in-state milk).
15
 
Thus, HSRA is incorrect that the focus of market-participant cases 
“is whether the particular challenged action or state law is its market 
participation” (HSRA:43), and that applying CEQA to the proprietary 
actions of public rail entities falls outside of the doctrine.  HSRA:49.  Like 
other market participant cases, applying CEQA to publicly-financed rail 
projects properly furthers the State’s proprietary interest in ensuring that 
agencies consider environmental impacts when spending public resources 
on publicly-pursued projects.  Engine Mfrs., 498 F.3d 1031. 
                                         
15
 In contrast, the market participant doctrine does not shield states’ 
exercise of their spending powers to regulate private conduct in a manner 
that would interfere with the National Labor Relations Act.  Chamber of 
Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008); Wis. Dept. of Indus., 
Labor and Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 287 (1986). 
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Nor does CEQA’s citizen enforcement mechanism transform state 
requirements for proprietary action into preempted regulations.  Engine 
Manufactures rejected an almost identical argument: “we do not see how 
action by a state or local government that is proprietary when enforced by 
one mechanism loses its proprietary character when enforced by some other 
mechanism.”  Engine Mfrs., 498 F.3d at 1048 (upholding rules that 
contained enforcement mechanisms). 
HSRA’s attempts to distinguish this holding are unavailing.  See 
HSRA:50.  First, CEQA’s codification in the Public Resources Code 
provides no meaningful basis for distinction.  Just like CEQA, the vehicle 
emission rules in Engine Manufacturers were adopted separately from the 
proprietary behavior they governed.  Nor did the Clean Air Act’s 
preemption waiver for certain California air regulations dictate the outcome 
in Engine Manufacturers.  See HSRA:51.  The Ninth Circuit observed that 
there was “no contention that California has obtained a waiver for the 
[challenged] Fleet Rules.”  Engine Mfrs., 498 F.3d at 1043 n.3. 
For similar reasons, HSRA incorrectly suggests that the 
“unprecedented” posture of this case casts doubt on employing the market 
participant doctrine.  HSRA:34-35.  First, at least one non-California case 
has allowed plaintiffs to rely on the doctrine to defeat preemption as against 
public agencies.  See Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Edu., 303 Conn. 
402, 449-54 (2012).  Moreover, Atherton properly rejected HSRA’s 
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argument, observing that “there is no authority supporting the argument 
that the power to ‘invoke’ the doctrine is reserved for [public agencies] to 
selectively assert in order to exempt those projects of [their] choosing from 
federal preemption.”  228 Cal. App. 4th at 339 (it is “unusual to say the 
least” that a public agency was asserting federal preemption “instead of 
defending the application of state law”).  As a question of law, the 
applicability of the market participant doctrine does not turn on the identity 
of the party that asserts it. 
Ultimately, it is the purpose, not the form, of the state action that 
matters.  Tocher, 219 F.3d at 1048-50.  State statutes that are intended to 
regulate private behavior fall outside of the market participant doctrine.
16
  
For instance, the False Claims Act provisions in the Grupp cases regulated 
the conduct of a private entity, DHL, not the conduct of public entities.  See 
New York ex rel. Grupp v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 19 N.Y.3d 278 
(2012); New York ex rel. Grupp v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 922 N.Y.S.2d 
888 (2011); DHL Express (USA), Inc. v. Florida ex rel. Grupp, 60 So.3d 
426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).  Similarly, the spending regulations in 
Gould and Chamber of Commerce v. Brown set standards for private 
                                         
16
 HSRA mistakenly relies on Whitten v. Vehicle Removal Corp., 56 
S.W.3d 293 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001), HSRA:43, 50, which did not consider the 
market participant doctrine.  Whitten found that Texas regulation of private 
tow operations was not covered by the “safety regulation exception” to 
preemption, which is unique to the FAAAA.  56 S.W.3d at 304-08. 
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individuals and entities that received public funds and contracts, 
purposefully regulating their behavior through the states’ spending power.  
Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60; Gould, 475 U.S. at 287. 
In contrast, enactments that are intended to govern a public entity’s 
proprietary actions – like the fleet rules upheld in Engine Manufacturers, 
the workforce standards applied in White, and CEQA here – are properly 
protected by the market participant doctrine. 
IV. Defendants’ Voluntary Agreements to Comply with CEQA Are 
Not Preempted. 
 
 HSRA does not dispute the general rule that voluntary agreements 
are not subject to preemption.  HSRA:51-53; see Flynn v. Burlington N. 
Santa Fe Corp., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1189 (E.D. Wash. 2000) (“no 
authority” under ICCTA for the proposition that a carrier is “precluded 
from voluntarily complying with local permitting regulations”).  Rather, 
HSRA asserts that if specific facts show a voluntary agreement 
unreasonably interferes with railroad operations, the presumption against 
preemption may be rebutted.  HSRA:53-54.  HSRA offers only a 
theoretical argument without facts relevant to this case. 
 Here, there is no question that Defendants voluntarily agreed to 
comply with CEQA on numerous occasions.  AR:9:4620-46 (Master 
Agreement with State); AR:13:6731 (Lease Agreement between NCRA and 
NWPCo); App:8:77b:2055, 2064, (2006 NWPCo Business Plan); 
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AR:17:8911 (Novato Consent Decree).  Defendants also voluntarily agreed 
that the right to operate under the lease was subject to Sonoma-Marin Area 
Rail Transit District’s consent, execution of equipment lease and tax 
approvals (AR:13:6731), and NWPCo’s compliance with the State Consent 
Decree (AR:13:6746). 
 Moreover, as HSRA concedes, the question of unreasonable 
interference is a fact-based inquiry.  HSRA:51.  Defendants cannot possibly 
demonstrate that enforcement of CEQA interferes with interstate 
commerce.  To the contrary, the facts here show unequivocally that CEQA 
compliance is a benefit, not a burden, because it was an integral element of 
the public funding to enable rail transport.  OB:48-51.  NCRA freely 
elected to receive over $31 million in state funds with conditions, including 
CEQA compliance, to start trains hauling freight in interstate commerce 
again.  This public financial support was also critical to the NCRA 
partnership with NWPCo to reopen the line.  See, e.g., AR:13:6595, 6600-
01, 6739, 6750. 
Enabling commerce is the opposite of interfering with commerce. 
See Mason & Dixon Lines Inc. v. Steudle, 683 F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(no dormant Commerce Clause violation when completion of state-funded 
road construction contract “encourage[s] the flow of commerce”); 
AR:17:8901-02 (in Novato Consent Decree, Defendants averring CEQA 
review is not “unreasonable burden on interstate commerce”).  A contrary 
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interpretation is antithetical to the ICCTA’s very purpose, which was 
enacted to allow railroads to be competitive against other modes of ground 
transportation. 
 As discussed, the only relevant transaction before the STB was a 
conveyance to NWPCo of NCRA’s right to operate; the STB lacks 
jurisdiction over line rehabilitation, repair and maintenance.  See Section 
I.C.  Since NWPCo and NCRA had agreed in the lease to condition 
NWPCo’s operation rights on NCRA’s CEQA compliance, the STB could 
not have approved anything different from rights given by the lease.  The 
STB could not approve rights NCRA did not have, including the right to 
proceed without CEQA compliance to which NCRA committed in the 
Master Agreement and its internal directive.
17
 
 Voluntary CEQA compliance here does not unreasonably burden 
railroad operations; in fact, the facts establish that CEQA compliance 
facilitates operations.  As HSRA concedes, Defendants have the burden to 
establish facts that a voluntary agreement constitutes an unreasonable 
burden on railroad operations.  Wichita Terminal Ass’n, BNSF Ry. & Union 
                                         
17
 The STB acknowledged that NWPCo’s right to operate was subject to 
conditions outside of its jurisdiction: “NWPCo. invoked the Board’s 
authority to acquire the common carrier obligations and, after repairs, to 
conduct rail operations on the line.”  AR:16:8540 (emphasis added).  Thus, 
the STB recognized that rail operations could occur after repairs, which 
under state law and the voluntary commitments of NCRA required CEQA 
review.   
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Pac. R.R. Co.— Petition for Declaratory Order, FD No. 35765, 2015 WL 
3875937, at *7 (S.T.B. June 22, 2015) (“voluntary agreements between rail 
carriers and state or local entities are not enforceable under § 10501(b) 
where [ ] the railroad demonstrates that enforcement of its agreement 
would unreasonably interfere with the railroad’s operations”) (emphasis 
added).  Because Defendants have never presented facts to rebut the 
presumption that the voluntary agreements benefit railroad operations, 
HSRA’s reliance on Woodbridge is unavailing.  Twp. of Woodbridge v. 
Consol. Rail Corp., Inc., FD No. 42053, 2001 WL 283507, at *2-3 (S.T.B. 
Mar. 22, 2001).  There is no onerous contract enforcement or law that 
unreasonably interferes with the line’s operations.  The STB’s HSRA 
decision is not binding authority.  See Mullaney v. Woods, 97 Cal. App. 3d 
710, 719 (1979); RB:11-12.  Moreover, the STB’s notion that a “potential   
. . . effect” of CEQA compliance through a third-party enforcement action 
would be sufficient to preempt voluntary agreements, absent specific facts, 
contravenes well-established case law.  See Franks Inv. Co., 593 F.3d at 
414-15.  
CONCLUSION 
The ICCTA reflects a century of congressional concern over 
economic regulation of railroads – such as unfair competition between rail 
carries, fair and non-discriminatory rates, and rail line expansions that 
might undo the rail industry.  The statute is not intended to wrest state 
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decisionmaking from California’s legislature or its people.  Plaintiffs 
respectfully request that the Court reverse the Court of Appeal and remand 
the case with directions to rule on the merits of Plaintiffs’ CEQA claims. 
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